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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In his new book, The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Jack Balkin 
achieves something remarkable.1  He paints an unflinchingly grim portrait of 
modern American politics that is at once brutally honest about the dire state 
of our predicament while also somehow brimming with optimism and hope.  
In that regard, it is Balkinsian to its core – sober and trenchant in its analysis, 
yet buoyant in its outlook.  Not many people could have written a book like 
this.  And we should be grateful that he has.  At a time like this, when it feels 
like the democratic sun is ever more likely to be shrouded in total darkness,2 
we need Balkin’s characteristic galloping prose and encouraging spirit to 
instill the belief that a brighter day lies ahead. 
This is not blind hope either.  The book’s optimism is based on 
substantive reflection – on a deep and serious examination of the structures of 
American constitutional time – of how, in the medium- and long-run, our 
political system has established and sustained its defining regularities.  
Perhaps, at present, everything appears hopeless and bleak.  Yet Balkin makes 
a strong case that, if only we look beneath the surface and take a longer view 
of historical development, if only we could focus on what he calls the cycles 
of constitutional time, we can begin to appreciate the true sources of the 
“recent unpleasantness,”3 and how those same sources may rescue us from the 
very troubles they have caused.  The astronomical forces of our political 
universe are to blame – but they also provide the tools for renewal.  We do 
not have to settle for relentless partisan warfare and polarization, 
demagoguery, racial retrenchment, and a persistent stifling of democratic will, 
trapped in a “cycle of corruption, cynicism, and despair.”4  We need not 
continue to suffer in a state of “constitutional rot.” 5  The cycles that brought 
us here are turning.  And if we understand them better, we might just allow 
them to carry us to a new dawn. 
This is an ambitious argument, one that weds constitutional with political 
theory and is rooted in history.  While it focuses on constitutionalism, it does 
not do so as conventional legal scholarship might.  Balkin has much to say 
about the judiciary (all of it illuminating), yet his understanding of 
constitutionalism is not tethered to jurisprudence.  He rightfully appreciates – 
as he has in so much of his prior work6 – that the Constitution is far more than 
a legal code or even a set of institutions, norms, and practices.  It is the 
interaction of all these things – the normative space sustained by the collective 
activity of using constitutionalism to make politics and the political system 
 
1. JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2020). 
2. Id. at 3-4, 65. 
3. Id. at 3. 
4. Id. at 48. 
5. Id. at 7. 
6. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4 (2011). 
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work.7  Accordingly, when Balkin talks about cycles of constitutional time – 
or constitutionalism more generally – he is talking about nearly everything: 
democratic politics, institutions, and practices in all their interlocking forms.8  
The book is much better because of this.  Balkin is quite right that we cannot 
understand how we got here without trying to understand how presidential 
and congressional politics, judicial politics and interpretation, political party 
structures and governance, and grassroots social activism have interacted.  To 
understand the state of our constitutionalism, we must see the whole picture. 
Yet because of this ambition, it is fair to ask if Balkin has identified all 
of the important pieces and adequately fit them together.  More specifically 
still, has he identified all of the sources of constitutional rot, and, in turn, what 
is likely to break it?  Perhaps if we probe certain aspects of Balkin’s portrait, 
we find cause to be less optimistic than he hopes. 
This skepticism will take the form of two distinct, but related, points.  
The first point is that Balkin has paid insufficient attention to a key variable 
that has always been a central concern of American constitutional and 
democratic theorists.  This is democratic culture itself – and, by extension, the 
problem of what defines and sustains a democratic people.  If we bring 
democratic culture into the picture, we might conclude that our rot runs even 
deeper than Balkin submits.  The second point builds from the first.  Because 
our condition of constitutional rot might be deeper than Balkin accepts, it 
might be harder to escape it.  The cycles can only do so much.  If history is 
any guide, the more likely source of change and renewal will come in the form 
of an external shock to our political system. 
II.  DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 
Democratic culture is by no means absent from Balkin’s account, but it 
is fair to say that it is not the focal point.  He argues that there are three 
constitutional cycles: the cycle of political regimes, the cycle of polarization, 
and the cycle of constitutional rot and renewal.9  Like gears in a machine, each 
cycle moves more or less on its own, and it just so happens that, at present, all 
three have lined up in a particularly disturbing way.10  We are enduring, he 
persuasively argues, the decadent final days of a decaying political regime, 
 
7. See id. For a related approach that situates the Constitution in the practice of 
claims making, see JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 4–12 (2018). 
8. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 10 (“My task…is to consider how these global trends 
are affecting the institutions of American democracy, filtered through our party 
system, institutional history, and constitutional structures.”). 
9. Id. at 6. 
10. Id. at 64–65. 
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extreme partisan polarization, and a period of sustained (and worsening) 
constitutional rot.11  It is bad enough when any of these cycles enters one of 
these stages; to suffer through the combination of the three is downright 
debilitating.  This is not only illuminating but deeply compelling. 
My questions begin to arise when Balkin explains why we are in a state 
of constitutional rot.  He identifies “Four Horsemen” of constitutional rot – 
political polarization, economic inequality, a loss of trust in the political 
system, and policy disasters12 – and one would find it difficult to argue with 
any of those.  But, in addition to, and perhaps even more significant than those, 
are we not in a period of rot because of decay in our democratic culture itself?  
Is this not an even more fundamental problem, from which the others have 
sprung and receive essential nourishment?  As noted, Balkin alludes to 
broader democratic culture, especially when he describes the gradual loss of 
trust in democratic life.  As he eloquently puts it, for “republics to function 
properly,” there must be “trust between members of the public, trust between 
the public and governments officials, and trust among government officials of 
different parties.”13  Indeed, “the public must not view their fellow citizens as 
incorrigible and implacable enemies.”14  From there, however, Balkin quickly 
pivots to democratic political structures and institutions – political parties, 
checks and balances, the separation of powers, constitutional limits on power, 
and the formal structure of our constitutional system.  He quotes Benjamin 
Franklin at the Constitutional Convention warning that the American system 
of constitutional government would only last as long as the American people 
remained uncorrupted.15  This warning, however, is only by way of preface to 
a broader discussion of constitutional structure and the various political and 
institutional mechanisms that the framers put in place in hopes of combatting 
inevitable republican rot.16  Thus, democratic culture tends to be subsumed 
under an institutional examination of the American regime. 
It would seem important, however, to focus as much on democratic life 
outside of formal political institutions – on the health of the democratic people 
who make up our body politic.  Here it is helpful to consider how some of the 
nation’s most perceptive democratic thinkers – particularly those who 
pondered the American political experiment in its earliest years – understood 
the foundations of representative self-government.  At the Founding, 
commentators stressed time and again that republican political institutions 
could not stand alone; they could not endure unless Americans behaved like a 
republican people.17  There was no surer way the experiment in republican 
 
11. Id. at 44–45. 
12. Id. at 49. 
13. Id. at 46. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 47. 
16. Id. at 47–48. 
17. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 
47–48 (1998). There were several dimensions to this line of thinking. Minimizing 
inequality was especially important to maintaining the kind of republican society that 
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self-government would fail than if “the people themselves” (an oft-used 
phrase)18 ceased to behave like republicans.  As the United States transformed 
into a democracy in the ensuing decades (at least for white males),19 the point 
remained as pertinent as ever.  Democracy, as one commentator after another 
stressed, needed more than democratic institutions and political procedures – 
it required democratic habits, sensibilities, and commitments.  Alexis de 
Tocqueville famously argued in Democracy in America – his penetrating 
portrait of civil society in Jacksonian America – that democracy was a set of 
mores – a habit of mind.20  A democratic people were the foundation of 
democratic governance.  The latter essentially depended on the former. 
This was often how the Founding generation talked about the 
Constitution’s prospects.  As numerous defenders of the Constitution insisted 
during the ratification struggle, the document would only be as strong as the 
people who breathed life into it.21  One Maryland author declared, “[T]he 
freedom of a nation does not so much depend on what a piece of parchment 
may contain, – as their virtue, – ideas of liberty – and ‘the sense of the people 
at large.’”22  Noah Webster, that astute cultivator of American culture, added, 
“[A] paper declaration is a very feeble barrier against the force of national 
habits, and inclinations.”23  If “on paper a form is not accommodated to those 
 
could support republican political institutions. See ERIC NELSON, THE GREEK 
TRADITION IN REPUBLICAN THOUGHT 195–233 (2004); Jonathan Gienapp, Using 
Beard to Overcome Beardianism: Charles Beard’s Forgotten Historicism and the 
Ideas-Interests Dichotomy, 29 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY 367, 374–79 (2014). 
18. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–8 (2004). 
19. In the early nineteenth century, as more white men came to enjoy greater 
political rights and exercise greater political power, non-white males were 
increasingly excluded from political life, creating something of a Herrenvolk 
democracy. See GERALD D. LEONARD & SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC: 
DEMOCRACY, EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S-
1830S 6–7, 43–44, 165–77, 221–23 (2019); ROSEMARIE ZAGARRI, REVOLUTIONARY 
BACKLASH: WOMEN AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 164–73, 179–80 (2007). 
20. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., 2003). On the importance of the concept of civil society in the early 
United States, see generally JOHN L. BROOKE, COLUMBIA RISING: CIVIL LIFE ON THE 
UPPER HUDSON FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE AGE OF JACKSON (2010). 
21. GIENAPP, supra note 7, at 104–07. 
22. Uncus, MD J., Nov. 9, 1787, reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, VOLUME 2, at 76, 81 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino 
eds., 1983). 
23. Giles Hickory III, Government, AM. MAG. , Feb. 1788, at 140 (author 
pseudonym for Noah Webster). 
5
Gienapp: Democratic Culture and Democratic Shocks: The Limits of Constitut
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
506  MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
habits,” he concluded, “it will assume a new form.”24  The Founding 
generation often exhibited a clear sense – in some ways far clearer than many 
who have inherited their work – of the relationship between constitutional text 
and structure and the spirit of a people. 
Given these assumptions, it was often said that, for the political system 
to work as envisioned, the people needed to exhibit the necessary civic virtue 
– that oft-invoked cornerstone of early modern republican thinking.25  Only a 
virtuous people, willing to sacrifice private interest in favor of the public good, 
could sustain a republic.26  “Virtue,” declared Noah Webster, was “the true, 
safe, and permanent foundation of a republic.”27  As the Revolutionary period 
unfolded, however, and it became clear that this spartan commitment to self-
abnegation was too easily ignored in practice, focus shifted to republican 
education and civic-mindedness.28  The people might not conquer self-interest 
or forego the fruits of modern commerce, but they could be knowledgeable.  
And that would provide the project in republican self-government its 
necessary foundation, molding the people into, as Benjamin Rush famously 
suggested, “republican machines.”29  For as John Adams had written so 
passionately in 1765 in A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law, the 
“spirit of liberty, without knowledge, would be little better than a brutal 
rage.”30 
Few ideas, accordingly, were as frequently extolled in Revolutionary 
America as that of an informed citizenry.31  “An ignorant people,” declared 
Reverend Zabdiel Adams, “will never long live under a free government.”32  
Only if the people were sufficiently educated and knowledgeable was self-
government even possible.  “I have looked on our present state of liberty as a 
short-lived possession,” Thomas Jefferson warned, “unless the mass of the 
 
24. Id. at 141. 
25. See generally J. G. A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLIC TRADITION (1975). 
26. WOOD, supra note 17, at 53, 55. 
27. Noah Webster, An Oration on the Anniversary of the Declaration of 
Independence, in 2 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760-
1805, AT 1220, 1226 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983). 
28. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 232–
34 (1992). 
29. BENJAMIN RUSH, A PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND 
THE DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN PENNSYLVANIA; TO WHICH ARE ADDED THOUGHTS 
UPON THE MODE OF EDUCATION, PROPER IN A REPUBLIC 27 (1786). 
30. JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW (1765), 
reprinted in THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 32 (C. Bradley 
Thompson ed., 2000). 
31. See generally RICHARD D. BROWN, THE STRENGTH OF A PEOPLE: THE IDEA 
OF AN INFORMED CITIZENRY IN AMERICA, 1650-1870 (1996). 
32. ZABDIEL ADAMS, A SERMON PREACHED BEFORE HIS EXCELLENCY JOHN 
HANCOCK, ESQ. 39 (1782). 
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people could be informed.”33  Nothing, he argued, opened the door for kings, 
tyrants, and demagogues more than “if we leave the people in ignorance.”34 
Given the importance of this aim, it was imperative that knowledge be 
widely disseminated so that public opinion would be adequately 
enlightened.35  “The diffusion of knowledge,” George Clinton declared in his 
1792 gubernatorial address to the New York legislature, “is essential to the 
promotion of virtue and the preservation of liberty.”36  This became one of the 
era’s defining refrains.  “Let us,” beseeched John Adams, “tenderly and kindly 
cherish, therefore the means of knowledge. . . Let us dare to read, think, speak 
and write.”37  “[L]let every sluice of knowledge be open’d and set a 
flowing.”38 
In light of this concern, members of the Founding generation focused, 
often obsessively, on the importance of public education and related 
mechanisms that might help circulate knowledge and shape people into 
capable democratic citizens.39  They often disagreed over what education 
ought to look like in practice and failed to realize many of their stated ideals.40  
Yet the importance they attached to education and the energy they poured into 
devising plans to promote it has rarely been paralleled in American history.  
 
33. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Littleton W. Tazewell (Jan. 5, 1805), 
NATIONAL ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-0958. 
34. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (Aug. 13, 1786), in 10 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 22 JUNE TO 31 DECEMBER 1786, at 243, 245 (Julian P. 
Boyd ed., 1954). 
35. On the emergence of public opinion during this period, see generally 
GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS 
DIFFERENT 244–74 (2006); TODD ESTES, THE JAY TREATY DEBATE, PUBLIC OPINION, 
AND THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE 1–13, 71–149 (2006); MARK 
G. SCHMELLER, INVISIBLE SOVEREIGN: IMAGINING PUBLIC OPINION FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO RECONSTRUCTION 47–54 (2016). 
36. George Clinton, Message to the State Legislature (Jan 5., 1792), in 2 STATE 
OF NEW YORK: MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS COMPRISING EXECUTIVE 
COMMUNICATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE AND OTHER PAPERS RELATING TO 
LEGISLATION FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FIRST COLONIAL ASSEMBLY IN 1683 
TO AND INCLUDING THE YEAR 1906, 319, 321 (Charles Z. Lincoln ed., 1909). See also 
ADAMS, supra note 32, at 40 (there was an “infinite necessity of diffusing intelligence 
among the body of the people”). 
37. ADAMS, supra note 30, at 32. 
38. Id. at 34. 
39. JOHANN NEEM, DEMOCRACY’S SCHOOLS: THE RISE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 
IN AMERICA 5–60 (2017). 
40. MARK BOONSHOFT, ARISTOCRATIC EDUCATION AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1-9 (2020). 
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Jefferson’s radical proposal to provide education at public expense in Virginia 
(although never fully realized) was the most famous project of its kind.41  The 
promotion of a national university – which more broadly embodied the 
widespread belief that American constitutionalism depended upon the 
cultivation of certain kinds of attitudes, morals, and manners – was another.42  
“Such a system of education as gives every citizen an opportunity of acquiring 
knowledge,” Noah Webster announced in 1788, was “the sine qua non of the 
existence of the American republics.”43  Thus, John Adams insisted, “the 
Whole People must take upon themselvs the Education of the Whole People 
and must be willing to bear the expences of it.”44  For decades to come, these 
calls resounded.45  “Upon the subject of education,” Abraham Lincoln would 
declare in 1832 in one of his first public addresses, it was “the most important 
subject which we as a people can be engaged in.”46 
Cultivating a democratic people, moreover, was conceived in broad 
terms.  Promoting civic education, establishing schools, nourishing virtue, 
ensuring that the populace was well-informed – these were all means of 
forging citizens and opening their eyes to the collective project of self-
governance in which they were engaged with others.  Numerous American 
political writers, consequently, stressed that democracy was far more than 
crude majoritarianism.  No doubt it necessarily presupposed “the majority 
principle,”47 but it could not wholly rest on it.  Democracy also had to be 
understood as a set of ethics – a way of relating to one’s fellow citizens and 
participating in the project of collective self-governance. 
The themes of social benevolence and mutuality pervaded the first 
century of American democratic writing.  Walt Whitman, among America’s 
greatest democratic poets, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century 
insisted that democracy was more than “individualism” translated into 
political practice.48  “[T]he people of our land . . . may all possess the right to 
vote – and yet,” he asked, “the main things may be entirely lacking?”  That 
was because democracy ultimately required, he wrote, “adhesiveness or love, 
that fuses, ties and aggregates, making the races comrades, and fraternizing 
 
41. ALAN TAYLOR, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S EDUCATION 161–91 (2019). 
42. GEORGE THOMAS, THE FOUNDERS AND THE IDEA OF A NATIONAL 
UNIVERSITY: CONSTITUTING THE AMERICAN MIND (2015). 
43. NOAH WEBSTER, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND FUGITIVE WRITINGS ON 
MORAL, HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY SUBJECTS 24 (1790). 
44. Letter from John Adams to John Jebb (Sept. 10, 1785), in 17 THE ADAMS 
PAPERS 424 (Gregg L. Lint et al. eds., 2014). 
45. See generally BROWN, supra note 31. 
46. Abraham Lincoln, Communication to the People of Sangamo County (Mar. 
9, 1832), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 8 (Roy P, Basler ed., 1953). 
47. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
48. Walt Whitman, Democratic Vistas, in WHITMAN, COMPLETE POETRY AND 
COLLECTIVE PROSE (1982). 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss2/8
2021] DEMOCRATIC CULTURE AND SHOCKS 509 
 
 
all.”49 Abraham Lincoln poignantly gestured toward a related set of motifs to 
close his First Inaugural Address, 
Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of 
affection.  The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battle-
field, and patriot grave, to every living heart and hearthstone, all over 
this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again 
touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.50 
In this vein, James Madison, James Wilson, John Quincy Adams, Ralph 
Waldo Emerson, Lydia Maria Child, Henry David Thoreau, Margaret Fuller, 
Calvin Colton, Frederick Douglass, John Stuart Mill, Whitman, Lincoln, and 
so many others stressed that self-government withered when individuals 
“retreat to unexamined willfulness” – when they internalized a sense that 
might alone made right.51  They each gave voice to the idea that democracy 
required what James Kloppenberg has called the “ethic of reciprocity” – a 
willingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of other citizens’ aspirations, 
especially those with whom you disagree.52 
What, for instance, made antebellum slaveholders so threatening in the 
eyes of northerners, what made them the “Slave Power,” as they came to be 
called in the years preceding civil war,53 was their rank refusal to behave as 
democrats.  Drawing on the tyranny they practiced at home, slaveholders 
thought politics was nothing more than an expression of naked political will, 
an arena for maximizing their peculiar interests at the expense of other 
members of the polity.54  When Abraham Lincoln was elected in 1860, the 
fact that white southerners chose the power play of secession rather than 
acquiesce to the democratic will of the nation confirmed the mortal threat they 




50. Abraham Lincoln, supra note 47, at 271. 
51. JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, TOWARD DEMOCRACY: THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-
RULE IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT quote 708, 605–11, 633–47, 705–08 
(2016). 
52. Id. at 6, 10–11. 
53. WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852-1856 
357–65 (1987). 
54. Id. 
55. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at 
Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (Roy 
P, Basler ed., 1953).  
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Building on this notion of democratic life and ethics, in the early 
twentieth century the Pragmatist philosopher and democratic theorist John 
Dewey contended that democracy was effectively an epistemic sensibility: a 
rejection of dogma and an embrace of fallibilism.56  “Democracy is a way of 
life,” he famously wrote.57  And “as compared with other ways of life is the 
sole way of living which believes wholeheartedly in the process of experience 
as end and as means.”58  Democracy was self-government through-and-
through.  It was not pointed toward a higher transcendent aim, nor could it be 
redeemed by a higher transcendent authority.  It demanded “faith . . . in the 
role of consultation, of conference, of persuasion, of discussion,” because 
self-government rested on faith in the capacities of fellow citizens.59  It was, 
therefore, as much process as end.  It was “an ethical conception, and upon its 
ethical significance,” Dewey argued, “is based its significance as 
governmental.  Democracy is a form of government only because it is a form 
of moral and spiritual association.”60  Democracy was not found “in counting 
the votes to see where the majority is formed.  It is in the process by which 
the majority is formed.”61  Later in the century, Richard Rorty amplified and 
expanded upon this Pragmatist defense of democracy, claiming that a spirit of 
unceasing, open inquiry could help lay the groundwork for new kinds of 
solidarities – in which a people slowly broadened its capacity to recognize the 
dignity of others.62 
According to these various theorists of American democracy, from the 
Founding to the present, the health of a democratic culture could be measured 
by how readily it exhibited the various traits and habits thus far identified.  A 
democracy was healthy when its people were educated and informed, when 
they recognized that democracy was a sensibility and an ethos more than an 
exercise of power or will, when they recognized the inherent fallibilism of 
human beings, when they acknowledged a shared reality from which common 
conversation became possible, and when they redeemed faith in one another 
through collective commitment to a common project. 
Which brings us back to the present.  It goes without saying, I think, that 
by these standards we are in a period of not only constitutional rot, but 
democratic rot.  As is reinforced on almost a daily basis, the citizenry is not 
informed in any of the ways that it needs to be – an ignorance that is 
 
56. See generally LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF 
IDEAS IN AMERICA (2001); RICHARD BERNSTEIN, THE PRAGMATIC TURN 70–88 
(2010). 
57. John Dewey, Creative Democracy—The Task Before Us, in 14 THE LATER 
WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY 226 (Jo Ann Boydston, R. W. Sleeper, & Anne Sharpe eds., 
2008). 
58. Id. at 229. 
59. Id. at 227. 
60. John Dewey, The Ethics of Democracy, in 1 THE EARLY WORKS OF JOHN 
DEWEY 240 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 2008). 
61. Id. at 234. 
62. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE (1999). 
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perpetuated and entrenched by pernicious information ecosystems that have 
destroyed any semblance of shared reality or facts (something Balkin 
identifies and emphasizes,63 but could stress even more than he does).  
Meanwhile, deliberation and reciprocity are increasingly unheard of.  In the 
hands of bad-faith actors, disproportionately drawn from certain political 
corners, politics has become a pure struggle of might – the precise 
unexamined willfulness that Lincoln and Whitman found so disconcerting 
(and antithetical to democracy).  It is difficult to maintain that we (or at least 
a sufficient number of us) are currently behaving like a democratic people to 
allow much of anything else in the political system to work. 
Is this not arguably the root cause of so much of our misery?  If, as so 
many of our democratic political theorists have previously stressed, our 
institutions are nothing more than a mirror of ourselves – a reflection of who 
we, the people, truly are – and the democratic culture that we embody, then it 
might just be that polarization, corruption, and the collapse of political trust 
are more epiphenomenal than foundational.  Perhaps even the structural 
inequities built into the Electoral College and the Senate or rampant partisan 
gerrymandering, never mind yawning wealth inequality, while no doubt 
exacerbating all of our problems, are not quite the root cause they sometimes 
are taken to be. 
These other factors should not be diminished, particularly those that have 
made possible minoritarian rule in the modern United States.  And before we 
are treated to yet another lesson on the perils of liberty under majoritarianism 
dressed up in the authority of the Founders,64 it should be stressed that the 
thoughtful meditations of James Madison and others on the potential tyranny 
of the majority in republican government and the need for institutional checks 
does not explain why state legislatures have gerrymandered congressional 
districts to ensure that their party holds a massively disproportionate number 
of congressional seats relative to their electoral support in the state,65 or why 
almost all states allocate presidential electors on a winner-take-all model.66  
 
63. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 49, 60–62, 119–22. 
64. See, e.g., Mike Lee, Of Course We’re Not a Democracy (Oct. 20, 2020), 
FIRST THINGS, https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2020/10/of-course-were-
not-a-democracy [https://perma.cc/5E92-BSP4]. 
65. See Laura Royden & Michael Li, Extreme Maps, BRENNAN CENTER FOR 
JUSTICE: TWENTY YEARS (2016), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Extreme%20Maps%2
05.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6PR-59VD]. 
66. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, WHY DO WE STILL HAVE THE ELECTORAL 
COLLEGE? 27–60 (2020) (on the partisan origins of winner-take-all distribution of 
state electoral votes). 
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The two have nothing to do with one another.67  That the naked promotion of 
political interest at the local level (what Madison and so many American 
framers openly reviled)68 has been twisted into Madisonian principle, is yet 
further evidence of how deep the rot runs. 
So, make no mistake about it, these modern anti-majoritarian 
entrenchments are contributing to our rot.  Abraham Lincoln was surely right 
when he asserted that “the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is 
wholly inadmissible.”69  That said, it is worth asking if our extra-institutional 
political culture, shaped by our various information ecosystems and practices 
of public pedagogy, is not the even deeper cause of our misery. 
However far we choose to extend the argument, it seems clear that our 
democratic culture is rotten – and that it is a key driver of constitutional rot.  
We might even add that a decay in democratic culture is the most debilitating 
condition of all and the hardest to break.  If so, there might be greater cause 
for pessimism than we would like to believe. 
III.  DEMOCRATIC SHOCKS 
Which brings me to my second main point: that it might be harder to get 
out of a condition of rot than Balkin suggests.  Here history is, once again, a 
helpful, if sobering, guide.  I wholly agree with Balkin that the two best 
examples of past constitutional rot in the United States are the 1850s and the 
Gilded Age – and that each presents alarming parallels to our current 
predicament.70  But I wonder about Balkin’s explanation for how Americans 
emerged from these rotten states: that the cycles pulled them out.  Inequality 
and polarization, he suggests, helped create new political coalitions that were 
more responsive to the population’s needs, which, in turn, helped depolarize 
the nation’s politics.71  I would suggest, in contrast, that it was not the cycles 
of constitutional time, but rather large shocks – major disruptions to the 
system itself, outside of the normal cycles – that pulled the nation out of past 
conditions of rot.  In both instances, catastrophic destruction proved 
necessary. 
 
67. See Jacob T. Levy, Democracy for Republicans (Feb. 20, 2019), NISKANEN 
CENTER, https://www.niskanencenter.org/democracy-for-republicans/ 
[https://perma.cc/9NFN-JREQ]; George Thomas, “America Is a Republic, Not a 
Democracy” Is a Dangerous – And Wrong – Argument: Enabling Sustained Minority 
Rule at the National Level is Not a Feature of Our Constitutional Design, But a 
Perversion of It (Nov. 2, 2020), THE ATLANTIC, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/11/yes-constitution-
democracy/616949/ [https://perma.cc/N9Z6-7Z4Z]. 
68. JACK N. RAKOVE, A POLITICIAN THINKING: THE CREATIVE MIND OF JAMES 
MADISON 54–95 (2017). 
69. Abraham Lincoln, supra note 47, at 268. 
70. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 45. 
71. Id. at 171–72. 
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What saved Americans from the extreme polarization, distrust, and 
oligarchy that marked the 1850s?  The Civil War.  That cataclysmic shock 
recalibrated the entire political system.  It enabled northern Republicans to 
rule for the better part of a decade free from the political obstruction of their 
former antagonists.  That, and that alone, enabled them to enact much of the 
reform that had been stymied just years earlier.72  It remains a great irony that 
so much of what has made our Constitution workable in the past century-plus 
are found in a set of constitutional amendments that never could have been 
added had the union hung together.73  Today, much could be changed in our 
constitutional and political system if once again a portion of the nation that 
happened to dominate one political coalition departed for a period of time.  
But therein lies the problem.  Constitutionalism did not fix the Constitution – 
war did.  A catastrophic shock. 
As for what eventually toppled the Gilded Age regime, once again 
external shocks seem to have been essential.  No doubt reform movements 
helped.74  That said, despite deep disgust with the political system, widespread 
calls for reforms and fundamental change, and a groundswell of democratic 
activism, nonetheless, as Balkin shows, the Gilded Age regime not only held 
on to power, but even expanded its grip on authority through the 1920s.75  
Even if the Progressive era ushered in meaningful changes (the significance 
and sweep of which historians continue to debate), it is assuredly arguable that 
the regime survived the onslaught.76 
It would take the triple shocks of two world wars and a global depression 
(events Balkin first mentions on the penultimate page of his book)77 to free 
the nation from this second period of rot and to usher in the New Deal and a 
new Democratic political majority.  Progressive social activism, in many 
ways, proved insufficient.  Progressive social reformers had certainly done the 
 
72. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE GREATEST NATION OF THE EARTH: 
REPUBLICAN ECONOMIC POLICIES DURING THE CIVIL WAR (1997). 
73. This point stands regardless of what is made of the legality of the 
Reconstruction amendments or what they signal about constitutional change. One 
these debates, see 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998); 
Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory: Reflections 
on Ackerman, Reconstruction, and the Transformation of the American Constitution, 
108 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2011, 2021 (1999). 
74. See generally ROBERT PUTNAM, THE UPSWING: HOW AMERICA CAME 
TOGETHER A CENTURY AGO AND HOW WE CAN DO IT AGAIN (2020) (offering a more 
optimistic take on how the nation emerged from the Gilded Age). 
75. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 16. 
76. David Brian Robertson, The Progressive Era, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF U.S. SOCIAL POLICY 41–58 (Daniel Béland, Kimberly J. Morgan, & Christopher 
Howard eds., 2014). 
77. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 173. 
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intellectual work.  When Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Dealers 
came to power, as Daniel Rodgers has shown, they did not have to search far 
for well-worked-out social welfare policy proposals.78  They simply had to 
pull them off the shelf, where Progressive thinkers, activists, and politicians 
had left them.  From a later perspective, it could be said that these Progressive 
social reformers ultimately prevailed.79  But it is one thing to tell that story in 
a lecture or a book, and quite another to live through it – to endure decades of 
roadblocks and failure. 
Charles Beard was one of those Progressives, and no doubt it was 
because he lived through a long period of constitutional rot, defined by 
yawning inequality and failed political reform, that he hashed out his famous 
(or infamous) thesis on the original Constitution.80  Why did big business 
always win in American public life?  Why did it have such a stranglehold on 
the state?  Why did it so effectively stifle grassroots reform?  Simple, Beard 
answered, the system had been designed that way.81  Just as it should not 
surprise us that Beard’s pessimism took shape during a period of rot, it also 
should not surprise us that the historians and political scientists who finally 
toppled Beardianism in the academy did so in the decades following World 
War II.82  That is, on the other side of the triple shocks that had helped make 
possible the kinds of social democratic reform that in Beard’s own day had 
been routinely stymied. 
For some time, it has been widely believed that the long period that 
followed the Second World War – that brought us the high-wage, high-
benefit, Fordist economy and an era of bipartisanship – represented the normal 
state of the American political system.83  But now, ever more commentators 
are beginning to wonder if this period was not, in fact, the great aberration – 
a unique byproduct, as Thomas Piketty has argued, of the extraordinary triple 
shocks of the first half of the twentieth century.84  As time has passed, perhaps 
we have returned to the true normal, entering a second Gilded Age, eerily 
similar to the first.  Balkin assuredly acknowledges these problems, but he 
thinks (or perhaps hopes) that the same cycles that brought us here contain the 
 
78. DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A 
PROGRESSIVE AGE, 437–46 (1998). 
79. For such a story, see PUTNAM supra note 74. 
80. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES (1913). 
81. Id.; see also ALAN GIBSON, UNDERSTANDING THE FOUNDING: THE CRUCIAL 
QUESTIONS 19–42 (2010). 
82. Alfred F. Young, American Historians Confront “Transforming Hand of 
Revolution”, in ALFRED F. YOUNG & GREGORY H. NOBLES, WHOSE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION WAS IT? HISTORIANS INTERPRET THE FOUNDING 33–59, 65–75 (2011); 
ALAN GIBSON, INTERPRETING THE FOUNDING: GUIDES TO THE ENDURING DEBATES 
OVER THE ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 7–21 (2009). 
83. On how the transformation of the postwar economy remade social ideas, see 
DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE (2011). 
84. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013). 
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seeds of renewal.  It is worth asking if this misses what has actually saved the 
nation from rot in the past – not the cycles, but a series of dramatic shocks that 
briefly freed Americans from their grip. 
That, however, raises a sobering question: unless there is a genuine 
shock to the system, how will we find our way out of the current state of rot?  
It might have been predicted that a global pandemic as devastating and 
disruptive as the one we are currently enduring would prove to be such a 
shock, but it does not seem to have had that effect.  Perhaps even more recent, 
unsettling events, like the violent insurrection, conducted on behalf of the 
sitting president, against the government of the United States, with the aim of 
subverting democracy and preventing the peaceful transfer of power, could 
turn out to be the kind of shock that makes a profound difference.85  It is 
certainly as pure a manifestation of our constitutional and democratic rot as 
anything conceivable, short of outright civil war.  But, as with the pandemic, 
early indications are that the Capitol riot will not have this kind of 
transformative effect – in either direction.  Thus far, it has only intensified 
partisan polarization.  And while things have continued to worsen, I still doubt 
that a civil war is on the horizon  – as much as recent events have made the 
unthinkable seem plausible and as much as the chattering classes enjoy 
pondering the possibility.86  Had there not been a civil war in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, it is easy to imagine the nation lurching from one 
bitter, polarizing controversy to the next, unable to forge any lasting 
compromise, or reform the underlying problems – stuck in a debilitating cycle 
of rot and decay.  Today, the cycles continue to turn.  But without a massive 
shock to the system, will it be enough? 
IV.  CONCLUSION: DEMOCRATIC HOPE 
Perhaps, then, Balkin’s constitutional cycles have limits – limits that 
consideration of our rotten democratic culture and past reliance on external 
shocks might expose.  To end on a more positive note, however, what I do 
know is that democracy is premised on hope.87  Every one of our great 
 
85. America’s Friends and Foes Express Horror as Capitol Attack “Shakes the 
World,” The NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/world/europe/trump-capitol-2020-election-
mob.html [https://perma.cc/3TV8-BJ2C]. 
86. See Greg Jaffe & Jenna Johnson, In America, Talk Turns to Something Not 




87. See RORTY, supra note 62. 
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democratic theorists have been optimists – great believers that things can get 
better; that our faith in self-government can be redeemed.  Our democratic 
culture is suffering – but nothing is more certain to kill it than cynicism.  So 
however persuasive Balkin’s arguments ultimately are (and, make no mistake, 
on balance they are deeply persuasive), the act of writing this book is 
unquestionably a deed of high citizenship.  We all need a bit of Jack Balkin in 
our lives, reminding us that, as bad as things are, they can get better.  Just as 
long as we are willing to hope. 
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